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Abstract 
 
This article is an exploration of a current environmental issue which is dividing two 
industries in the UK.  The issue is offshore windfarms, and the industries are 
commercial fishing and wind energy.  We show how there is an unequal power 
relationship between the two industries, with the wind energy industry dominant, 
supported by both the Government and public opinion, but the fishing industry must 
be consulted by the developers, and it has a compelling case for the re-siting of 
turbines away from prime fishing grounds, or for compensation for loss of access to 
those grounds.  We draw on interviews carried out with offshore developers, 
regulators, and representatives of the fishing industry to demonstrate that the 
controversy over offshore windfarms highlights three core issues of conflict: the 
adequacy of stakeholder consultation processes; the right to compensation for loss of 
livelihood; and the lack of adequate data.  We found that the characterisations that 
developers, regulators, and fishers hold of each other, critically inform their positions 
on these issues.   We examine the weak bargaining position of fishers, and the ‘power 
game’ that is played out between them and developers.  Our conclusion is that 
offshore wind farm development would be better managed if stakeholder consultation 
was more extensive; compensation claims were more standardised; and scientific data 
was more readily available, but that in the meantime, fishers could improve their 
bargaining power by mobilising potential allies.  
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1. Introduction  
The British Government has repeatedly expressed its commitment to renewable 
energy. For instance, under the Kyoto Protocol, it has signed up to cuts of 12.5% in 
the 1990 levels of the six main greenhouse gases by between 2008 and 2012  It has 
also promised to cut emissions of CO2, the main greenhouse gas produced by human 
activity, to 20% below 1990 levels by 2010.  Moreover, in 2000, the Government 
pledged to provide 10% of UK electricity from renewable sources by 2010, and in the 
Energy White Paper (2003), an additional goal of 20% from renewables by 2020 was 
set.  There are three main reasons for these commitments.  First, declining North Sea 
oil and gas reserves leave Britain facing the unhappy prospect of relying on foreign 
suppliers in regions of economic volatility or political instability, like Russia and the 
Middle East.  Second, the falling unit cost of renewable energy means that it is fast 
becoming competitive with conventional energy sources.  Third, public opinion, 
measured in surveys such as MORI (2003) and the DTI (2002), is strongly in favour 
of renewable energy in general, and wind energy in particular. 
 
This governmental support for renewable energy has given a substantial boost to wind 
energy projects, the most advanced of all the renewable technologies (MacCullaich, 
2001). However, the success rate for onshore applications is low, in a planning system 
structured in favour of approval.  Only two in five applications are given permission, 
with a further few granted on appeal (Toke, forthcoming).  While the public 
apparently favours windfarms generally, much publicised opposition exists to 
particular sites.  Critics point to the visual effect of the turbines; their impact on the 
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landscape; the lack of suitable space to build them; their effect on the local economy; 
and the land use and planning conflicts encountered with them1.   
 
A way of managing the impetus for renewable energy and meeting the climate change 
targets, yet avoiding these problems, is to seek alternatives other than onshore 
developments.  If clean, green, renewable energy from windfarms is the answer, then 
siting offshore is often seen as the way to implement it.  Indeed, in July 2003, the 
Government invited developers to bid for sites in the second offshore windfarm 
round.  Together, these potential sites could generate up to 7% of the UK’s energy 
supplies.  Currently, one offshore windfarm from Round One has started generating 
electricity, the construction of another is nearing completion, and up to three more 
will be built in the next two years.  
 
However, this is not to imply that offshore windfarms are necessarily free from the 
environmental, planning, and siting problems of onshore sites2.  Nor are they free 
from constraints and conflicts; as we shall consider, they are the site of fierce 
disputes.  Complex regulatory procedures exist to try and manage this conflict.  These 
procedures are as follows3.  First, the Crown Estate Commissioners grant leases for 
installations in the seabed, incorporating various rights and obligations.  Second, 
developers require a licence for depositing articles in or on the sea or seabed under the 
Food and Environmental Protection Act (1995), controlled by the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Ports Division of the 
Department for Transport (DfT).  As part of this application, developers must include 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Pasqualetti (2001:692); Elliott (1997:155); Walker (1995:56); Wolsink (1994); and 
Bosley and Bosley (1988:317). 
2 Henderson (2002); Hartnell and Milborrow (2001).   
3
 This summary draws on Cassidy and Cooksley (2001a; 2001b). 
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details of correspondence with consultative bodies, and submit an Environmental 
Statement (or a reason why one has not been done).  Third, under the Coast Protection 
Act (1949), consent is required for the construction of works or depositing of 
materials on, under or over the seashore, and special consent is required if this is 
likely to obstruct navigation.  Developers must therefore advertise their proposals and 
consult those likely to be affected, including the relevant statutory conservation body, 
such as English Nature or the Countryside Council for Wales; details of these 
discussions are included with the application.  If the proposed site is up to the limit of 
territorial waters then consent can be granted under the Transport and Works Act 
(1992).  This requires an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and the 
preparation of an Environmental Statement.  
 
There are further procedures which may also apply.  For developments with a 
generating capacity greater than 50 MW, consent is required under the Electricity Act 
(EA) (1989) for their construction and operation, including laying cables.  Under the 
EA, the application is sent to the nearest local authority, who must be consulted as 
part of the Environmental Statement.  Also under the EA, the developer must 
demonstrate regard for the natural beauty of a site, its flora, fauna, geographical 
features of special interest, and buildings and objects of architectural, historic or 
archaeological interest, and detail measures for their preservation.  The Joint Nature 
Conservation Committee (JNCC), the statutory consultee to the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI), is involved at this stage, and advises the DTI about whether to 
approve an application. The EA requires the application to be advertised locally and 
nationally, allowing objections to be lodged.  Objections from the relevant planning 
authority to the Secretary of State result either in a public inquiry, or conditions being 
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imposed on the developer.  The Secretary of State uses their discretion about whether 
to hold a public inquiry if objections are received from other sources.  Further, the 
recently published ‘The Future Offshore’, from the DTI requires a Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) in the development of offshore renewables.  This 
has been applied to Round Two of the consent process.  The SEA has a number of 
critical requirements, including the consultation of stakeholders.  It is therefore clear 
that the permitting process is a long and complicated one; and that a key part of it is 
stakeholder consultation.   
 
 
2. The significance of stakeholders 
The above account of the regulatory framework indicates that the Government’s 
commitment to offshore windfarms is not without constraints, and one of the crucial 
constraints with windfarms, onshore or offshore, is the effect on relevant stakeholders.  
Onshore, these may be local residents, farmers, and the tourist industry.  But when 
Still argues that “by comparison with land-based wind farms, particularly in the UK 
and Europe, offshore areas [are] less likely to be in conflict with other activities” 
(2001: 548), this seems a little optimistic.  Stakeholder concerns may be just as 
relevant offshore as onshore.  As Clibbon (2003) notes, the concerns of other sea 
users are central when developing an offshore windfarm.  These include uses for 
recreation, shipping, and radar4.  However, as Danielsen (1995), and Sorensen et al 
(2001a) note, the group most affected are fishers, whose very livelihood is at risk.  
 
                                                 
4
 See Tong (1998: 408); Farrier (1997:87); Hartnell and Millborrow (2001:23). 
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The DTI press release accompanying the announcement of the second round of 
offshore bids did warn that the impacts would mean “developers cannot assume 
therefore that any site within the areas for which The Crown Estate is inviting tenders 
will be problem free”5.  It has been repeatedly stated that addressing these ‘problems’ 
means informing, consulting, and engaging with the public and stakeholders.  For 
example, it is often pointed out that developers should engage in a ‘dialogue’ with 
stakeholders, implying a two way and on-going interaction, not merely a programme 
of information provision (Jessien and Larsen 1999:580)6.  Consultation should take 
place early in the process7, and the results of it must be demonstrable8.  Further, the 
planning process for offshore projects should be as open as possible to allow those 
affected to have some involvement and influence in the project9.  Hansen (2003) notes 
that achieving this kind of involvement is very challenging, but very important. 
 
In this paper, we examine the issue of the development of offshore windfarms, 
focusing on the purposes, processes and outcomes of consultation with fishers in the 
development of offshore wind power.  Most of our material is derived from 18 
telephone interviews conducted in late 2003 with the three major sets of players in the 
development process - fishers, developers and regulators - and we begin with 
characterisations by these groups of themselves and each other.  We then highlight 
how these characterisations influence the three core issues raised by the consultation 
process: the adequacy of consultation; compensation claims; and data deficiencies.  
We discuss the implications of this analysis for the bargaining position of fishers, and 
                                                 
5
 DTI Press release 14th July 2003: obtained from the DTI website, accessed October 2003 
6
 Sorensen et al (2000:486) state that this should be a “fruitful dialogue”, and Goodall (1999:59) makes 
it clear that “meaningful and substantial dialogues” are required with interested parties. 
7
 Sorensen et al (2001:30); Sorensen et al (2001b:3); Petersen and Neumann (2003); Hansen (2003). 
8
 Hansen (2003) 
9
 Petersen and Neumann (2003); Henderson (2002:17). 
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we suggest ways in which that weak bargaining position could be improved, by more 
astute political footwork.  Our conclusion is that offshore wind farm developments 
could be more effectively managed if consultation processes were more systematic; 
compensation claims were treated more consistently; and data deficiencies were more 
vigorously addressed. 
 
 
3.  Characterisations of fishers, developers and regulators 
3.1 Fishers  
We begin our characterisations of the three major groups with fishers.  Currently, 
there are 12,000 commercial fishers in the UK.  Most work on small boats, under 10 
metres, fishing mainly in inshore waters (within 12 miles of land), with an average 
annual income of about £15,000.  Many fishers belong to local organisations which 
represent their interests, and in some cases distribute fish quotas.  These organisations 
may be affiliated to national organisations, such as the National Federation of 
Fishermens’ Organisations (NFFO) in England and Wales, and the Scottish 
Fishermens’ Federation (SFF).  However, these national organisations tend to 
represent the larger vessels rather than the smaller boats; less than 20% of English and 
Welsh fishers are NFFO members.  The industry is highly fragmented, which 
sometimes leads to acrimonious relations between inshore and offshore fishers; 
between potters and netters; and between local fishers and national representatives.  
Among our interviewees, we found three competing characterisations of fishers – 
‘stewards of the sea’; ‘legitimate harvesters’; and ‘booty hunters’; we will consider 
each of these in turn.   
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If fishers are seen as stewards of the sea, they perform a public service in protecting 
the marine environment.  Their self-interest connects with the public interest, because 
a healthy marine ecosystem is the best guarantee of thriving stocks of target fish.  
Representatives from the fishing industry described the considerable practical 
knowledge that fishers have of marine life.  Fishers are able to monitor the sea for 
signs of damage caused, for example, by pollution from agricultural run-off, toxic 
anti-fouling paint, ship tank discharges, and climate change.  The representatives were 
keen to point out that fishers do not feel they have a ‘monopoly’ on using the sea, but 
are willing to share their valuable knowledge about it.  Similarly, some of the 
regulators also felt that fishers were a useful source of knowledge about the marine 
environment, but admitted that it was sometimes overlooked. 
 
If fishers are seen as legitimate harvesters, they have a right to fish in the sea (a public 
resource), provided they do so in a sustainable manner.  This entails a derivative 
entitlement to be treated as a stakeholder, and includes “a right to be consulted and a 
right to comment on any development”, according to one developer.  This was 
recognised by both regulators and developers, who noted that windfarms (particularly 
during their construction) could have a serious deleterious impact on fishers’ incomes.  
Because of this, fishers might also have a right to compensation if prevented from 
accessing their fishing grounds.  The right to be consulted is shared with other sea 
users however, and does not mean that fishers should be privileged over them.  
According to a Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) official, these uses 
included recreational angling, yachting, ferries, cargo ships, cruise liners, navy 
vessels, rescue boats, oil and gas platforms, and cable-laying equipment.   
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If fishers are seen as booty hunters, they care little for the marine environment, 
misreport catches, and seek only to line their own pockets.  An environmental 
consultant described fishers as having “an image problem”.  One form of ‘booty’ 
pursued by fishers is compensation for lost fishing opportunities.  A number of 
developers and regulators said that while some fishers had a right to be involved in 
the consultation process, and that some claims for compensation were genuine (and 
were being taken seriously), other fishers were “chancers” and jumped on the 
compensation bandwagon, hoping to exploit the situation.   
  
The point about these three alternative characterisations is that they affect the 
consultation process.  If fishers are seen as stewards of the sea (with invaluable 
knowledge of the marine environment) then we would expect developers to have a 
duty and an interest in consulting them.  Even if fishers are seen as legitimate 
harvesters, then their views should be taken into account.  But if they are perceived as 
merely booty hunters, then developers may have little interest in consulting with 
them, and are likely to dismiss their claims for compensation as opportunism.  The 
extent to which this is the case, is more fully considered below. 
 
3.2  Developers 
We now turn to the characterisations of the developers, which similarly affect the 
relationship between groups.  For example, if fishers perceive that developers are 
motivated by profit, this is likely to affect how they react towards them.  This may be 
both in terms of the involvement fishers expect in the process, and whether they are 
able to ask for compensation for the impact of developments upon them.  
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There are 13 UK offshore windfarm developers, responsible for 19 projects, of which 
only one is currently operational.  This contrasts with 31 onshore windfarm 
developers, who have built 87 onshore windfarms in the UK.   Some offshore 
developers are short term players, aiming only to bid for sites and secure planning 
consent, before selling the projects to long term developers to build and operate them.  
A national trade association – the British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) – 
brokers between developers and other stakeholders, including regulators, fishers, 
statutory conservation agencies, and environmental NGOs.  The offshore windfarm 
industry is fragmented, with considerable commercial rivalry between companies.  
Two characterisations of offshore windfarm developers predominated: green 
missionaries and profit-maximisers.  
 
On the first view, offshore developers are motivated not by money, but a mission to 
promote green energy.  For example, one developer said that his commitment to 
offshore windfarms was “out of principle”.  This is due to the benign environmental 
footprint of wind energy, its contribution to climate change targets, and high public 
support. Indeed, another developer perceived 99% of the public to be behind his 
company.  Some developers felt a duty, along with the Government, to educate the 
public, to reduce the gap between generic support for wind energy and opposition to 
particular proposals.   
 
However, on the second view, developers are seen as profit-maximisers, becoming 
involved in projects not because of any green objective, but because of hardnosed 
economic calculations.  As one developer said, “we have to be driven by commercial 
reality”.  Another stated that his company avoided environmentally sensitive sites 
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because this “could double the time required for consent”.  Additionally, offshore 
projects have economic advantages over onshore projects, including greater 
economies of scale and more generous government subsidies.  Of course, developers 
may espouse environmentalism to gain a commercial advantage, but this is using a 
green image as a means, rather than having a green objective. 
 
3.3  Regulators 
There were two main characterisations of the regulators of offshore windfarm 
developments: heavily supportive; and inexperienced, inefficient, and under-
resourced.  If they are seen as supportive, then the position of the fishers is weakened.  
If they are seen as inexperienced, then the authority of their decisions is undermined 
in the eyes of both fishers and developers.  
 
The perception that regulators are heavily supportive of offshore windfarms is 
widespread.  On this view, the Government is putting its full weight behind offshore 
projects, providing generous public funding to companies who undertake them, and 
facilitating fast track planning approvals: only one project from Round One went to 
public inquiry (Scarweather Sands in south Wales; which was approved).  Also, 
although the Government succumbed to environmentalists’ pressure to institute an 
SEA before Round Two bids were invited, it was completed in record time (five 
months), and according to one interviewee, the three areas selected were virtually 
chosen by the developers themselves.  Moreover, the very short timescale allowed for 
consultation – four weeks – made it almost impossible for opposition to be mobilised.  
The fishers’ representatives felt they had minimal power to object to windfarms in the 
face of this impetus; and that regulators did not listen to their concerns; gave little 
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information or guidance; and did not use available procedures to involve fishers in the 
process. 
 
Similarly, environmentalists said that the Government’s rush to implement windfarms 
meant it sometimes rode roughshod over environmental considerations.  An advisor at 
English Nature said that the SEA exercise was flawed for not looking at the UK as a 
whole, but choosing three areas and then doing an SEA on them.  Similarly, a JNCC 
representative said the SEA foreclosed many options, with too short a timescale for 
consultation.  Even some developers were critical.  One said the Government failed to 
consider cumulative impacts, while another argued that the SEA should have taken 12 
months, not five.  A consultant fisheries scientist observed that the DTI and Crown 
Estate could have improved Round One by excluding controversial areas: merely 
requiring the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) to identify such 
areas.  In Round Two, the DTI did not appear to have asked MAFF’s successor, 
DEFRA, to identify such sites within the SEAs.   
 
The contrary perception – that the Government is inexperienced, inefficient and 
under-resourced – was less widespread but still evident.  One developer referred to 
“horrendous delays” in departmental decision-making because of shortages of 
resources and expertise.  Another stated that a lack of resources, information and 
experience at the DTI made them unhelpful, and a third made a similar claim about 
DEFRA.  As we shall see, a lack of data about the impacts of developments is a key 
issue, and differentially affects those involved.    
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Having completed our characterisations of the three major players in offshore 
windfarms, we now turn to the three core issues in the controversy: consultation 
processes; compensation demands; and data deficiencies. 
 
 
 
 
4.  Three core issues: consultation processes; compensation demands; and data 
deficiencies 
4.1  Consultation Processes 
Both negative and positive views exist of the consultation process.  Those who 
viewed it negatively pointed to the extremely variable amount of consultation carried 
out by developers.  An environmental consultant pointed to very little consultation of 
fishers taking place at several sites, despite a very significant fishery existing in one 
area, as a result of bids for windfarms virtually amalgamating it into a single site.  A 
regulator also admitted hearing stories about poor consultation of fishers.  Even some 
developers, while pointing to their own extensive consultation of fishers, 
acknowledged that other companies were not so thorough. 
 
Another weakness highlighted by the fishing industry was the form of the consultation 
exercises that developers conducted with them.  Fishers preferred face-to-face 
meetings with developers, rather than public meetings.  The JNCC representative 
explained that this is because fishing is a “people industry”, with a person-based oral 
culture.  There were also reports of tension, distrust and resentment between local 
fishers and the fisheries liaison officers (FLOs) appointed by developers, or those 
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seen as outside ‘experts’ presuming to know about local fisheries.  The undue speed 
of some of the consultation processes with fishers was also criticised; indeed, the 
JNCC member highlighted that the four weeks for the SEA consultation compared 
unfavourably with the 12 months allowed for oil and gas project consultations.  
Fishers also criticised developers for manipulating the consultation process, where 
agreements were only reached if they advantaged or did not disadvantage the 
developer.  A developer gave an example of this, describing the opportunity for 
fishers to comment on the proposed layout of the turbines (on which there was some 
leeway), but not on the overall location of the windfarm (on which the developer was 
not prepared to negotiate).   
 
More seriously, fishers’ representatives argued that consultation was largely 
irrelevant, because of the Government commitment; this is part of the characterisation 
of regulators as heavily supportive of offshore windfarms.  Fishers’ representatives 
described the consultation processes as mere cosmetic exercises, with little 
meaningful dialogue at national level between fishing and wind energy 
representatives – by contrast to the good working relationship built up between the 
fishing industry and the oil, gas and cable industries.  Indeed, they described these 
relationships as “partnerships”, demonstrating the effective co-operation that can 
exist. The JNCC representative agreed that fishers were effectively excluded from the 
process, which was really a ‘tick-box’ approach.  Even a developer said that 
companies would achieve consents from the Government despite fishers’ objections.  
Fishers also alleged that some developers manipulated consultation by giving a good 
impression that the processes are real rather than cosmetic.  On this view, the 
consultation processes are a sham, but a clever sham, as these developers were seen to 
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be more successful; this concurs with a view of developers as profit motivators, 
seeking to maximise their chances of consent.  One developer said his company could 
have abandoned negotiations “if the [fishers] were unreasonable”, and that fishers 
knew “they could end up with nothing” if this happened; a lost livelihood and no 
compensation for it.  Another developer pointed out that consent was granted in one 
site, even though some fishers’ objections were never withdrawn.  In this negative 
view of the extent and form of consultation (expressed largely, but not exclusively, by 
fishers), while stakeholders may sometimes be able to influence the process, the 
power remains with the developer. 
 
By contrast, developers, and some regulators, took a more positive view, claiming that 
extensive and high quality consultation took place.  Indeed, a representative of the 
wind industry said they were “bending over backwards to talk to people”.  All the 
developers interviewed emphasised their pro-active consultation with fishers.  One 
said that his company undertook “two or three years worth of consultation” at one 
site, an assertion supported by an environmental consultant who cited this as a 
developer going “to great lengths to get to know the fishermen, and get them on side”.  
Another developer referred to “early and extensive consultation with fishers”, and 
argued that his company were “well ahead of the game” in the extent of its 
consultation.  Evidence of benefits to fishers from consultation included moving the 
site of a windfarm after meetings with fishers.  The RSPB representative claimed that 
early consultation of stakeholders meant a greater opportunity to “actually try and get 
better siting of projects”.   
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Citing their efforts to engage fishers, many developers implied that if consultation did 
not take place, it was because fishers did not take the opportunities offered to them, or 
because of the difficulties of negotiating with the highly fragmented fishing industry.  
The weight given to these explanations varied according to the characterisations of 
fishers used.  For example, one developer attributed the breakdown in negotiations 
between fishers and the FLO to local fishers seeking to exploit the situation for their 
advantage.  A second developer regarded national fishers’ organisations as a malign 
influence on negotiations, partly because they disliked dealing with FLOs who were 
appointed by developers, one of whom they dismissed as a “company stooge”, even 
though he had the confidence of the local fishers.  A third developer described the 
attitude of a fishers’ representative to windfarm company executives as “I’ve got to 
screw these guys for everything I can get”.   
 
However, at least some developers claimed that, despite these obstacles, they still 
took a positive view of consultation, recognising that fishers have the right to be 
consulted, because they were legitimate stakeholders with claims that had to be taken 
into account.  More self-interestedly, one developer said that until stakeholder 
concerns are addressed, the DfT will not give consent, and another claimed that 
stakeholders, including fishers, have the ability (at least in theory) to stop projects.  
Evidence supporting this self-interested approach to consultation comes from one 
developer who said that “we did a lot of consultation and I think that was really 
reflected in our consent application.  The minister felt that we had all these people 
who were voicing concerns, but clearly they had engaged with the developer in a very 
thorough way and their requests were put down”.   It was clear, therefore, that 
developers (and, indeed among all interviewees), considered that a low level of 
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consultation could prejudice bids to obtain planning consent.  Engaging in 
consultation took considerable effort, time and resources, but was considered 
worthwhile in the long term, not least because it lessened the risk of a public inquiry.  
One developer said that “if you don’t do it, it’s at your own peril, because any 
statutory body can call you to inquiry. Even a groundswell of public opinion can 
initiate a public inquiry, and that’s an expensive and lengthy process”.  Developers, 
therefore, ignored stakeholders at their peril.   
 
4.2  Compensation Demands 
The views that groups have of each other and of the consultation process clearly 
affects whether compensation is seen as appropriate.  As suggested earlier, while 
developers may deem some fishers deserve compensation, they are deeply critical of 
others who submit fictitious claims.  Conflicts over compensation between fishers and 
developers exist on three issues: the ethics, type, and amount of compensation.   
 
On the ethics of compensation, fishers described a moral right to compensation, 
because the siting of windfarms on fishing grounds eroded their (legitimate) 
opportunities to earn their livelihood.  One representative pointed to the payments 
made by the oil and gas industries for interrupting fishing activity, and argued that 
fishers only sought compensation as a last resort.  Liaison and partnership were better 
approaches, but when fishers were faced by a “huge juggernaut coming towards 
them”, they had little alternative but to seek compensation.  Some developers also 
acknowledged fishers’ right to compensation, but in certain circumstances only.  
Fishers who had lost “a large proportion of their fishing ground”, and who “really 
fished at the site”, deserved to be compensated.  Some could also “quite rightly claim 
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compensation” during the construction phase, although this might only be for “a week 
or two”.  In effect, fishers who were legitimate harvesters within an area were entitled 
to compensation, but those who were only seeking to ‘booty hunt’, were not. 
 
On the type of compensation, there was controversy over whether money should be 
paid to individual fishers (direct compensation), or into a trust fund set up to benefit to 
fishers collectively (indirect compensation).  Fishers and most developers favoured 
the first option, but some developers preferred the second, again reflecting their 
opinion of fishers.  For example, one developer, cynical about fishers’ motives, 
believed they were only motivated to make money out of the situation, not by 
concerns about the marine environment.  Significantly therefore, his company 
favoured developing long term schemes for community benefit, rather than paying out 
lump sums to individual fishers. 
 
Two themes existed about the amount of compensation, again depending on 
developers’ characterisations of fishers.  The first was that some fishers demanded far 
too much compensation for lost fishing opportunities; these were fishers as booty 
hunters.  One developer referred to the “spurious compensation claims made by 
fishers – never substantiated”.  Another described “ludicrously exaggerated” claims 
submitted by companies who owned the fishers’ vessels, demanding maximum 
compensation, based on fraudulent statements.  Even a fishers’ representative 
dismissed some fishers’ compensation claims as “extortion”.   
 
The second theme was the insistence by developers on evidence from fishers to 
support any claims.  One developer stated that “if you are going to affect someone’s 
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livelihood and they can prove it, then it’s only fair that there should be some sort of 
compensation package with it”. Clearly, the key here is for fishers to be able to “prove 
it”.  The implication is that if they are genuinely legitimate harvesters of an area of the 
sea, then they will be able to prove it, and that they deserve compensation.  If they are 
not, then they will not be able to provide evidence, and will not deserve 
compensation.  One developer affirmed a willingness to pay compensation if a 
substantiated case for negative impact on livelihood was produced – not just to silence 
fishers and defuse their opposition.   
 
4.3  Data Deficiencies 
This idea of fishers proving their claims relates to the third core issue in the offshore 
windfarm controversy – data deficiency.  A frequently recurring theme was the lack 
of reliable data on which to base decisions about SEAs, individual sites, and 
compensation claims.  Data were inconclusive about both the fishing in an area, and 
the environmental impact of turbines upon it.  However, there was a minority 
perception that the data was adequate, and some interviewees even expressed the 
opinion that there was too much data!  We will examine these three different views in 
turn, and their implications.  
 
The first view – lack of reliable data - was particularly relevant to information 
supplied by fishers about their activities.  One developer said that a “big problem in 
dealing with fishers is that they won’t give data… most developers have bad 
experiences of fishers giving poor data”.  Another asserted that there was a “wide gap 
between fishers’ claims and their data”.  Some developers were initially sympathetic 
to fishers, aware that they do not keep good records, but became less so when fishers 
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seemed deliberately unco-operative and even gave false data.  Developers became 
cynical about fishers’ motives, suspecting many of booty hunting and opportunism.  
They therefore used these deficiencies in data to justify excluding fishers from 
consultation, or for negating their calls for compensation.  One developer even stated 
that the DTI gave consent in one case because of the unreliability of fishers’ data cited 
in their objection. 
 
The second view of data was that while there are gaps, sufficient data exists for 
dealing with offshore proposals.  The JNCC representative argued that “everyone’s 
always going to want more data, but what we have to do is work with the data that we 
have at the moment”.  The English Nature advisor endorsed this pragmatic approach, 
stating that constructing windfarms in the absence of data was necessary to generate 
the data about their impacts, and English Nature only intervene in offshore sites where 
they know of a damaging environmental impact – such as Shell Flats, where the 
Common Scoter is at risk.  The view that experience would bring more data was 
commonplace.  Indeed, one developer described a particular windfarm “as a 
demonstration project – to obtain the data for later projects”.  An environmental 
consultant stated that regulators could adjust future conditions to take account of new 
data as it appeared, and a developer claimed that the four years between the 
completion of Round One and Round Two projects allowed sufficient time for lessons 
to be learned and implemented.  If there is little data, the position advocated is often 
to build and then assess (any) damage.  This does not seem to support a view of 
fishers as legitimate stakeholders who have a right to influence decisions before they 
are made. 
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The third view of data deficiency - that there was too much data already – highlights 
that politically explosive information can be revealed.  One developer observed that 
more data makes the marine environment appear more precious, describing one site 
where such extensive research was undertaken that data that could undermine the 
project was found.  The developer in question reflected ruefully that a less thorough 
but still sufficient EIA would have probably given the site immediate consent.  This 
cynical but practical view relates back to developers’ motivations; being motivated by 
environmental considerations may entail an impetus to undertake thorough 
environmental data collection; being motivated by profit means securing the 
application’s success is paramount, and may mean a reluctance to gather more data 
than is absolutely necessary for that end. 
 
 
5.  The ‘power game’: considering the bargaining position of fishers 
The above analysis of the offshore windfarm controversy reveals important features 
of the ‘power game’ between developers and stakeholders.  We will discuss this 
power game from the perspective of the fishing industry, because it is the weakest 
player, and has most to lose.  Our discussion of the bargaining position of fishers is 
divided into two parts – fishers’ current weaknesses and potential strengths. 
 
Our analysis of the characterisations of the three leading players and the three core 
issues in windfarm conflicts has exposed five weaknesses in the fishers’ current 
position.  The first is the chronic fragmentation of the fishing industry.   Few fishers 
are members of national organisations (which are themselves competing federations 
of often fractious groupings), and local organisations are loose and fissiparous.  
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Moreover, as one developer pointed out, many fishing communities are also divided 
into rival factions.  Fishers often compound this weakness by abandoning any united 
fronts as soon as compensation is mentioned.  A fishers’ representative also pointed 
out that fishers are often picked off by developers exploiting this disunity.  The 
second weakness in the fishers’ position is the Government’s enthusiastic support for 
offshore windfarms.  As a fishers’ representative described, the huge political impetus 
from Kyoto driving the offshore windfarm campaign makes fishers unimportant in 
comparison.  The third weakness in the fishers’ position is public support for offshore 
windfarms, which are often preferred over developments onshore.  One developer 
noted that the sea is a public space and offshore windfarms visually unobtrusive, 
while another said that building offshore appealed because “people cannot whinge 
about Nimbyism”.  Given this public backing for offshore windfarms, and the 
increasingly poor public image of fishers, it is unsurprising that fishers attract little 
public support in their fight against offshore developers.   
 
The fourth factor weakening the fishers’ position is the superior strength of the 
offshore wind industry.  Developers may be confident of consent, provided they 
satisfy environmental requirements, because of the Government’s support for wind 
energy.  They can therefore afford to call the bluff of fishers, rejecting ‘bogus’ 
compensation claims.  A developer described making it clear to fishers that any 
compensation would be withdrawn if they did not agree to their deal.  The image of a 
poker game occurs from another developer’s description, with both parties waiting to 
see who blinked first; but invariably, developers can hold out longer than fishers.  
Moreover, developers can afford to fund data collection on fishing activity that can 
undermine the case for re-siting or compensation made by fishers.  The incomplete 
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record-keeping by fishers puts them in a poor light by comparison.  Also, developers 
have the resolve borne of a recognition that they have nowhere else to go, because of 
the increasing rate of rejection of onshore sites by planning authorities, where, as one 
developer noted, decisions often turn on political, not environmental considerations; 
in effect, the public backlash against onshore projects is an extra incentive for 
offshore development.   
 
The fifth weakness of fishers is a lack of natural allies in their fight with offshore 
developers; fishers appear to be largely on their own.  They cannot draw on support 
from other sections of society, because the government, the public, the statutory 
conservation agencies, and the green NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth, all favour windfarms at sea, and no other industry has backed the fishers.  
 
However, from our analysis of the consultation process, four potential strengths in the 
fishers’ position can be identified.  First, fishers can draw support from their local 
communities, where they often contribute to the economy and traditional culture.  The 
fate of fisheries-dependent communities does register on the political radar screen, at 
regional, national and EU levels, so there is some significance in this factor.  But to 
capitalise on it, local fishers may need to put aside internal differences and present a 
united front in negotiations with developers.  Second, there is a potential alliance 
between fishers and the conservation lobby.  Some conservation agencies have 
misgivings about the environmental impacts of windfarms; indeed, the English Nature 
representative predicted that new bird life data is likely to bedevil Round Two 
projects.  Fishers could gain some political weight by joining forces with this lobby to 
campaign against offshore projects.  A developer said that both regulators and 
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developers fear the environmental lobby more than they fear the fishing industry.  As 
the cumulative impacts of offshore developments become clearer, a combined 
strategy could resonate with the public, and create real difficulties for developers and 
regulators alike.  Even some developers hinted at the negative implications of the 
cumulative impact of offshore turbines.  
 
The fishers’ third potential strength comes from a greater role for their national 
organisations in national negotiations with developers, reducing the fragmented nature 
of the fishing industry.  Antagonism between local and national fishers’ 
representatives fatally undermines fishers’ positions in such negotiations.  The 
importance of national organisations is beginning to be recognised both by the 
Government (in setting up liaison groups), and by the wind energy industry (by 
issuing the BWEA (2002) guidelines on consultation).  If fishers shared this 
recognition, they could benefit from a more systematic, uniform and comprehensive 
approach to future windfarm proposals that their national organisations could provide, 
considerably improving their local bargaining position. 
 
The fishers’ final potential strength lies in exploiting the fragmented position of the 
developers.  Developers do not present a united front in their negotiations with 
fishers, but perceive themselves as individual entrepreneurs: “each developer did their 
own thing” said one.  This undermines the image of developers being motivated by 
environmental concerns, for, surely, these concerns would unite them.  The JNCC 
representative noted the greater fragmentation of the offshore wind industry than the 
oil and gas industries, and that developers have not yet learned to collaborate.  
Moreover, even one developer said that they do not mobilise their own allies 
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particularly well, and are sometimes vulnerable to concerted action by local groups.  
Although the BWEA serves as a co-ordinator for companies, it brokers between them 
and stakeholders at a national level, not in site level negotiations. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored the relationship between two unequal parties – fishers 
and developers (with the third party – the regulator – largely on the side of the 
developers) - in offshore windfarm conflicts.  We found that the conflict is driven 
partly by negative characterisations of each party by the others; partly by inadequate 
consultation processes organised by developers; partly by controversial claims to 
compensation submitted by fishers; and partly by a lack of scientific data on the 
marine environment.  If these deficiencies are addressed, there could be a more 
rational and equitable system of management of offshore windfarm development.  In 
the meantime, however, only if fishers learn to play the political game, and mobilise 
potential allies, will they stand a chance of resisting the relentless spread of offshore 
wind turbines. 
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